Archive for the 'statistics' Category

Usual Drug Trial Analyses Insensitive to Rare Improvement

Sunday, May 20th, 2012

In a comment on an article in The Scientist, someone tells a story with profound implications:

I participated in 1992 NCI SWOG 9005 Phase 3 [clinical trial of] Mifepristone for recurrent meningioma. The drug put my tumor in remission when it regrew post surgery. However, other more despairing patients had already been grossly weakened by multiple brain surgeries and prior standard brain radiation therapy which had failed them before they joined the trial.  They were really not as young, healthy and strong as I was when I decided to volunteer for a “state of the art” drug therapy upon my first recurrence.  . . .  I could not get the names of the anonymous members of the Data and Safety Monitoring committee who closed the trial as “no more effective than placebo”. I had flunked the placebo the first year and my tumor did not grow for the next three years I was allowed to take the real drug. I finally managed to get FDA approval to take the drug again in Feb 2005 and my condition has remained stable ever since according to my MRIS.

Apparently the drug did not work for most participants in the trial — leading to the conclusion “no mnore effective than placebo” — but it did work for him.

The statistical tests used to decide if a drug works are not sensitive to this sort of thing — most patients not helped, a few patients helped. (Existing tests, such as the t test, work best with normality of both groups, treatment and placebo, whereas this outcome produces non-normality of the treatment group, which reduces test sensitivity.) It is quite possible to construct analyses that would be more sensitive to this than existing tests, but this has not been done. It is quite possible to run a study that produces for each patient a p value for the null hypothesis of no effect (a number that helps you decide if that particular patient has been helped) but this too has not been done.

Since these new analyses would benefit drug companies, their absence is curious.

Gene Linked to Autism?

Sunday, April 8th, 2012

An article in the New York Times describes research that supposedly linked a rare gene mutation to autism:

Dr. Matthew W. State, a professor of genetics and child psychiatry at Yale, led a team that looked for de novo mutations [= mutations that are not in the parents] in 200 people who had been given an autism diagnosis, as well as in parents and siblings who showed no signs of the disorder. The team found that two unrelated children with autism in the study had de novo mutations in the same gene — and nothing similar in those without a diagnosis.

“That is like throwing a dart at a dart board with 21,000 spots and hitting the same one twice,” Dr. State said. “The chances that this gene is related to autism risk is something like 99.9999 percent.”

It is like throwing 200 darts at a dart board with 21,000 spots (the number of genes) and hitting the same one twice. (Each person has about 1 de novo mutation.) What are the odds of that? If all spots are equally likely to be hit, then the probability is about 0.6. More likely than not. (Dr. State seems to think it is extremely unlikely.) This is a variation on the birthday paradox. If there are 23 people in a room, it is 50/50 that two of them will share a birthday.

When Dr. State says, “The chances that this gene is related to autism risk is something like 99.9999 percent,” he is making an elementary mistake. He has taken a very low p value (maybe 0.000001) from a statistical test to indicate the likelihood that the null hypothesis (no association with autism) is true. P values indicate strength of evidence, not probability of truth.

One way to look at the evidence is that there is a group of 200 people (with an autism diagnosis) among whom two have a certain mutation and another group of about 600 people (their parents and siblings) none of whom have that mutation. If two instances of the mutation were randomly distributed among 800 people what are the odds that both instances would be in any pre-defined group of 200 of the 800 people (defined, say, by the letters in their first name)? The chance of this happening is 1/16. Not strong evidence of an association between the mutation and the actual pre-defined group (autism diagnosis).

Another study published at the same time found an link between autism and a mutation in the same gene identified by Dr. State’s group but again the association was weak. It may be a more subtle example of the birthday paradox: If twenty groups of genetics researchers are looking for a gene linked to autism, what are the odds that two of them will happen upon the same gene by chance?

If the gene with the de novo mutations is actually linked to autism, then we will have insight into the cause of 1% of the 200 autism cases Dr. Smart’s group studied. When genetics researchers try so hard and come up with so little, it increases my belief that the main causes of autism are environmental.

Thanks to Bryan Castañeda.

“Seth, How Do You Track and Analyze Your Data?”

Tuesday, March 20th, 2012

A reader asks:

I haven’t found much on your blog commenting on tools you use to track your data. Any recommendations? Have you tried smart phones? For example, I have tried tracking fifteen variables daily via the iPhone app Moodtracker, the only one I found that can track and graph multiple variables and also give you automated reminders to submit data. There are other variants (Data Logger, Daytum) that will graph one variable (say, miles run per day), but Moodtracker is the only app I’ve found that lets you analyze multiple variables.

I use R on a laptop to track and analyze my data.  I write functions for doing this — they are not built-in. This particular reader hadn’t heard of R. It is free and the most popular software among statisticians. It has lots of built-in functions (although not for data collection — apparently statisticians rarely collect data) and provides lots of control over the graphs you make, which is very important. R also has several programs for fitting loess curves to your data. Loess is a kind of curve-fitting. There is a vast amount of R-related material, including introductory stuff, here.

To give an example, after I weigh myself each morning (I have three scales), I enter the three weights into R, which stores them and makes a graph. That’s on the simple side. At the other extreme are the various mental tests I’ve written (e.g., arithmetic) to measure how well my brain is working. The programs for doing the test are in R, the data is stored in R, and analyzed with R.

The analysis possibilities (e.g., the graphs you can make, your control over those graphs) I’ve seen on smart phone apps are hopelessly primitive for what I want to do. The people who write the analysis software seem to know almost nothing about data analysis. For example, I use a website called RankTracer to track the Amazon ranking of The Shangri-La Diet. Whoever wrote the software is so clueless the rank versus time graphs don’t even show log ranks.

I don’t know what the future holds. In academic psychology, there is near-total reliance on statistical packages (e.g., SPSS) that are so limited perhaps they can extract only half of the information in the usual data. There are many graphs you’d like to make that it is impossible to make. SPSS may not even have loess, for example. Yet I see no sign of this changing. Will personal scientists want to learn more from their data than psychology professors (and therefore be motivated to go beyond pre-packaged analyses)? I don’t know.

Causal Reasoning in Science: Don’t Dismiss Correlations

Thursday, July 7th, 2011

In a paper (and blog post), Andrew Gelman writes:

As a statistician, I was trained to think of randomized experimentation as representing the gold standard of knowledge in the social sciences, and, despite having seen occasional arguments to the contrary, I still hold that view, expressed pithily by Box, Hunter, and Hunter (1978) that “To find out what happens when you change something, it is necessary to change it.”

Box, Hunter, and Hunter (1978) (a book called Statistics for Experimenters) is well-regarded by statisticians. Perhaps Box, Hunter, and Hunter, and Andrew, were/are unfamiliar with another quote (modified from Beveridge): “Everyone believes an experiment except the experimenter; no one believes a theory except the theorist.” (more…)

The Problem with Evidence-Based Medicine

Sunday, July 11th, 2010

In a recent post I said that med school professors cared about process (doing things a “correct” way) rather than result (doing things in a way that produces the best possible outcomes). Feynman called this sort of thing “cargo-cult science“. The problem is that there is little reason to think the med-school profs’ “correct” way (evidence-based medicine) works better than the “wrong” way it replaced (reliance on clinical experience) and considerable reason to think it isn’t obvious which way is better.

After I wrote the previous post, I came across an example of the thinking I criticized. On bloggingheads.tv, during a conversation between Peter Lipson (a practicing doctor) and Isis The Scientist (a “physiologist at a major research university” who blogs at ScienceBlogs), Isis said this:

I had an experience a couple days ago with a clinician that was very valuable. He said to me, “In my experience this is the phenomenon that we see after this happens.” And I said, “Really? I never thought of that as a possibility but that totally fits in the scheme of my model.” On the one hand I’ve accepted his experience as evidence. On the other hand I’ve totally written it off as bullshit because there isn’t a p value attached to it.

Isis doesn’t understand that this “p value” she wants so much comes with a sensitivity filter attached. It is not neutral. To get it you do extensive calculations. The end result (the p value) is more sensitive to some treatment effects than others in the sense that some treatment effects will generate smaller (better) p values than other treatment effects of the same strength, just as our ears are more sensitive to some frequencies than others.

Our ears are most sensitive around the frequency of voices. They do a good job of detecting what we want to detect. What neither Isis nor any other evidence-based-medicine proponent knows is whether the particular filter they endorse is sensitive to the treatment effects that actually exist. It’s entirely possible and even plausible that the filter that they believe in is insensitive to actual treatment effects. They may be listening at the wrong frequency, in other words. The useful information may be at a different frequency.

The usual statistics (mean, etc.) are most sensitive to treatment effects that change each person in the population by the same amount. They are much less sensitive to treatment effects that change only a small fraction of the population. In contrast, the “clinical judgment” that Isis and other evidence-based-medicine advocates deride is highly sensitive to treatments that change only a small fraction of the population — what some call anecdotal evidence. Evidence-based medicine is presented as science replacing nonsense but in fact it is one filter replacing another.

I suspect that actual treatment effects have a power-law distribution (a few helped a lot, a large fraction helped little or not at all) and that a filter resembling “clinical judgment” does a better job with such distributions. But that remains to be seen. My point here is just that it is an empirical question which filter works best. An empirical question that hasn’t been answered.

Does Lithium Slow ALS?

Friday, July 9th, 2010

In 2008, an article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) reported that lithium had slowed the progression of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), which is always fatal. This article describes several attempts to confirm that effect of lithium. Three studies were launched by med school professors. In addition, patients at PatientsLikeMe also organized a test.

One of Nassim Taleb’s complaints about finance professors is their use of VAR (value at risk)  to measure the riskiness of investments. It’s still being taught at business schools, he says. VAR assumes that fluctuations have a certain distribution. The distributions actually assumed turned out to grossly underestimate risk. VAR has helped many finance professionals take risks they shouldn’t have taken. It would have been wise for finance professors to wonder how well VAR does in practice, thereby to judge the plausibility of the assumed distribution. This might seem obvious. Likewise, the response to the PNAS paper revealed two problems that might seem obvious:

1. Unthinking focus on placebo controls. It would have been progress to find anything that slows ALS. Anything includes placebos. Placebos vary. From the standpoint of those with ALS, it would have been better to compare lithium to nothing than to some sort of placebo. As far as I can tell from the article, no med school professor realized this. No doubt someone has said that the world can be divided into people focused on process (on doing things a certain “right” way) and those focused on results (on outcomes). It should horrify all of us that med school professors appear focused on process.

2. Use of standard statistics (e.g., mean) to measure drug effects. I have not seen the ALS studies, but if they are like all other clinical trials I’ve seen, they tested for an effect by comparing means using a parametric test (e.g., a t test). However, effects of treatment are unlikely to have normal distributions nor are likely to be the same for each person. The usual tests are most sensitive when each member of the treatment group improves the same amount and the underlying variation is normally distributed. If 95% of the treatment group is unaffected and 5% show improvement, for example, the usual tests wouldn’t do the best job of noticing this. If medicine A helps 5% of patients, that’s an important improvement over 0%, especially with a fatal disease. And if you take it and it doesn’t help, you stop taking it and look elsewhere. So it would be a good idea to find drugs that only help a fraction of patients, perhaps a small fraction. The usual analyses may have caused drugs that help a small fraction of patients to be considered worthless when they could have been detected.

All the tests of lithium, including the PatientsLikeMe test, turned out negative. The PatientsLikeMe trial didn’t worry about placebo effects, so my point #1 isn’t a problem. However, my point #2 probably applies to all four trials.

Thanks to JR Minkel and Melissa Francis.

Unlikely Data

Thursday, July 8th, 2010

Connoisseurs of scientific fraud may enjoy David Grann’s terrific article about an art authenticator in the current New Yorker and this post about polling irregularities. What are the odds that two such articles would appear at almost the same time?

I suppose I’m an expert, having published several papers about data that was too unlikely. With Saul Sternberg and Kenneth Carpenter, I’ve written about problems with Ranjit Chandra’s work. I also wrote about problems with some learning experiments.

Beijing Street Vendors: What Color Market?

Wednesday, June 9th, 2010

Black market = illegal. Grey market = “the trade of a commodity through distribution channels . . . unofficial, unauthorized, or unintended.”

In the evening, near the Wudaokou subway station in Beijing (where lots of students live), dozens of street vendors sell paperbacks ($1 each), jewelry, dresses, socks, scarves, electronic accessories, fruit, toys, shoes, cooked food, stuffed animals, and many other things. No doubt it’s illegal. When a police car approaches, they pick up and leave. Once I saw a group of policemen confiscate a woman’s goods.

What’s curious is how far vendors move when police approach. Once I saw the vendors on a corner, all 12 of them, each with a cart, move to the middle of the intersection — the middle of traffic — where they clustered. At the time I thought the traffic somehow protected them. Now I think they wanted to move back fast when the police car went away. Tonight, like last night, there’s a police car at that corner, the northeast corner of the intersection. No vendors there. The vendors who’d usually be there were now at the northwest corner. In other words, if a policeman got out of his car and walked across the street, he’d encounter all the vendors that he’d displaced.

Can John Gottman Predict Divorce With Great Accuracy?

Sunday, June 6th, 2010

Andrew Gelman blogged about the research of John Gottman, an emeritus professor at the University of Washington, who claimed to be able to predict whether newlyweds would divorce within 5 years with greater than 90% accuracy. These predictions were based on brief interviews near the time of marriage. Andrew agreed with another critic who said these claims were overstated. He modified Gottman’s Wikipedia page to reflect those criticisms. Andrew’s modifications were removed by someone who works for the Gottman Institute.

Were the criticisms right or wrong? The person who removed reference to them in Wikipedia referred to a FAQ page on the Gottman Institute site. Supposedly they’d been answered there. The criticism is that the “predictions” weren’t predictions: they were descriptions of how closely a model fitted after the data were collected could fit the data. If the model were complicated enough (had enough adjustable parameters), it could fit the data perfectly, but that would be no support for the model — and not “100% accurate prediction” as most people understand it.

The FAQ page says this:

Six of the seven studies have been predictive—each began with a hypothesis about factors leading to divorce. [I think the meaning is this: The first study figured out how to predict. The later six tested that method.] Based on these factors, Dr. Gottman predicted who would divorce, then followed the couples for a pre-determined length of time. Finally, he drew conclusions about the accuracy of his predictions. . . . This is true prediction.

This is changing the subject. The question is not whether Gottman’s research is any help at all, which is the question answered here; the question is whether he can predict at extremely high levels (> 90% accuracy), as claimed. Do the later six studies provide reasonable estimates of prediction accuracy? Presumably the latest ones are better than the earlier ones. The latest one (2002) was obviously not about accurate prediction estimates (its title used the term “exploratory”) so I looked at the next newest, published in 2000. Here’s what its abstract says:

A longitudinal study with 95 newlywed couples examined the power of the Oral History Interview to predict stable marital relationships and divorce. A principal components analysis of the interview with the couples (Time 1) identified a latent variable, perceived marital bond, that was significant in predicting which couples would remain married or divorce within the first 5 years of their marriage. A discriminant function analysis of the newlywed oral history data predicted, with 87.4% accuracy, those couples whose marriages remained intact or broke up at the Time 2 data collection point.

The critics were right. To say a discriminant function “predicted” something is to mislead those who don’t know what a discriminant function is. They don’t predict, they fit a model to data, after the fact. To call this “true prediction” is false.

To me, the “87.4%” suggests something seriously off. It is too precise; I would have written “about 90%”. It is as if you asked someone their age and they said they were “24.37 years old.”

Speaking of overstating your results, reporting bias in medical research. Thanks to Anne Weiss.

Andrew Gelman’s Top Statistical Tip

Tuesday, March 30th, 2010

Andrew Gelman writes:

If I had to come up with one statistical tip that would be most useful to you–that is, good advice that’s easy to apply and which you might not already know–it would be to use transformations. Log, square-root, etc.–yes, all that, but more! I’m talking about transforming a continuous variable into several discrete variables (to model nonlinear patterns such as voting by age) and combining several discrete variables to make something [more] continuous (those “total scores” that we all love). And not doing dumb transformations such as the use of a threshold to break up a perfectly useful continuous variable into something binary. I don’t care if the threshold is “clinically relevant” or whatever–just don’t do it. If you gotta discretize, for Christ’s sake break the variable into 3 categories.

I agree (and wrote an article about it). Transforming data is so important that intro stats texts should have a whole chapter on it — but instead barely mention it. A good discussion of transformation would also include use of principal components to boil down many variables into a much smaller number. (You should do this twice — once with your independent variables, once with your dependent variables.) Many researchers measure many things (e.g., a questionnaire with 50 questions, a blood test that measures 10 components) and then foolishly correlate all independent variables with all dependent variables. They end up testing dozens of likely-to-be-zero correlations for significance. Thereby effectively throwing all their data away — when you do dozens of such tests, none can be trusted.

My explanation why this isn’t taught differs from Andrew’s. I think it’s pure Veblen: professors dislike appearing useful and like showing off. Statistics professors, like engineering professors, do less useful research than you might expect, so they are less aware than you might expect of how useful transformations are. And because most transformations don’t involve esoteric math, writing about them doesn’t allow you to show off.

In my experience, not transforming your data is at least as bad as throwing half of it away, in the sense that your tests will be that much less sensitive.